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THE SONNABEND ESTATE AND FAIR MARKET  
VALUATION OF CANYON 
CHARLOTTE MELBINGER† 
INTRODUCTION 
In late 2007, Ileana Sonnabend, a renowned gallerist and art-scene mainstay, 
passed away, leaving behind a massive collection of art worth hundreds of 
millions of dollars.1 At the helm of two galleries in Paris and New York, 
Sonnabend worked for decades to promote and foster contemporary art and 
artists, and her galleries displayed the works of many well-known artists, 
such as Roy Lichtenstein and Robert Rauschenberg.2 Among the artworks 
in Sonnabend’s personal collection at her death was Rauschenberg’s Canyon, 
a celebrated collage painting from the artist’s Combine series.3 Rauschenberg 
 
† Symposium Editor and Alumni Chair, Volume 163, University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 
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Great thanks are due to Ralph Lerner for providing research materials on the Sonnabend case, and 
to Sharon Lorenzo for her guidance and mentorship with this project. I am very grateful to the 
editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review for their great skill and dedication. 
1 See Kelly Crow, An Art Impresario Gets Her Due, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2013, at D6, available 
at PROQUEST, File No. 1418626653 (reporting that Sonnabend’s personal art collection was 
valued at nearly $900 million); Charmaine Picard, Sonnabend Estate Sold for $600m, ART NEWSPAPER 
(May 1, 2008), http://theartnewspaper.com/articles/Sonnabend-estate-sold-for-600m/8510, archived at 
http://perma.cc/M6ST-WFSS (reporting the Sonnabend heirs’ sale of art valued at approximately 
$600 million and estimating the remaining collection’s value at $300 million); Roberta Smith, 
Ileana Sonnabend, Art World Figure, Dies at 92, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/10/24/arts/24sonnabend.html? pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/V4CK-S6V3 
(eulogizing Sonnabend and recounting her achievements as an art dealer). 
2 See generally Crow, supra note 1 (describing notable exhibitions at Sonnabend’s galleries and 
pieces set to appear at an exhibition in Sonnabend’s honor that opened in December 2013). 
3  See Julia Blaut, Overview: Life and Art, ROBERT RAUSCHENBERG FOUND., 
http://www.rauschenbergfoundation.org/artist (last visited Mar. 13, 2015), archived at http://
perma.cc/3LKF-KE5R (“The celebrated Combines, begun in the mid-1950s, brought real-world images 
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created Canyon from an array of materials, including a stuffed American 
bald eagle.4 Canyon, already famous, gained notoriety when it came time to 
value Sonnabend’s estate for federal estate tax purposes. 
 
Figure 1: Canyon5 
 
and objects into the realm of abstract painting and countered sanctioned divisions between 
painting and sculpture.”); Eileen Kinsella, Rauschenberg Eagle Ruffles Feathers, ARTNEWS (May 1, 
2012), http://www.artnews.com/2012/05/01/rauschenberg-eagle-ruffles-feathers, archived at http://
perma.cc/YN2W-9G3E (describing Canyon as “Robert Rauschenberg’s seminal 1959 ‘combine’ work”). 
4 See infra fig.1 (displaying Canyon); infra fig.2 (listing the materials incorporated in the work); 
see also infra fig.3 (describing Raushenberg’s incorporation of the taxidermy eagle into Canyon). 
5 Photograph by Charlotte Melbinger at the Museum of Modern Art (Nov. 1, 2013) (on file 
with author). 
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Figure 2: The Description Plaque Alongside Canyon  




6 Photograph by Charlotte Melbinger at the Museum of Modern Art (Nov. 1, 2013) (on file 
with author). 
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7 Robert Rauschenberg, Notarized Statement About Canyon (May 27, 1998) (unpublished 
statement) (on file with Withers Bergman LLP). 
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The legal restrictions of the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act 
(BGEPA) and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) banned the sale or 
other disposition of Canyon, and therefore those administering Sonnabend’s 
estate listed a value of zero for the painting when assessing Sonnabend’s 
significant property interests.8  To reach its determination of zero fair 
market value, the estate consulted three professional appraisals, all in 
concurrence.9 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rejected this position 
and instead estimated Canyon’s fair market value at $65 million.10 The IRS 
then notified the estate of a $29.2 million tax liability deficiency on the 
painting, and because the Internal Revenue Code empowers the IRS to 
assign a penalty in the event that a taxpayer makes a “substantial valuation 
understatement,”11 it also imposed an $11.7 million penalty.12 
This Note assesses the IRS’s valuation of Canyon as an application of 
fair market valuation principles in federal taxation. The Note begins with a 
background of relevant tax rules, followed by a discussion of prior case law 
dealing with illegal and other restricted property and artwork. In light of 
this context, the Note then criticizes the IRS’s analysis in its valuation of 
Canyon: The IRS’s position is problematic, and it demonstrates some of the 
unique difficulties with applying fair market valuation principles to artwork. 
Both the IRS’s and the estate’s conclusions are imperfect, but the $65 million 
valuation stands too many degrees removed from a realistic determination. 
 
8 Interview with Ralph Lerner, Attorney, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Oct. 28, 2013) (explaining, as 
counsel for the estate, the estate’s valuation position). 
9 See BSJ Fine Art, Fair Market Value Appraisal for Estate Tax Filing Purposes (Nov. 3, 
2011) (unpublished appraisal) (on file with Withers Bergman LLP) (affirming its appraisal of zero 
value despite the IRS’s valuation position); Jacqueline Silverman & Assocs., Rebuttal to the IRS 
Appraisal Review Report ( June 6, 2011) [hereinafter Silverman & Associates Rebuttal] (unpublished 
appraisal) (on file with Withers Bergman LLP) (affirming the zero-value appraisal of Canyon and 
noting its agreement with the appraisal, done by Christie’s, of Sonnabend’s collection upon Sonnabend’s 
death); see also Kinsella, supra note 3 (noting the estate’s use of three qualified appraisers). 
10 Daniel M. Beckerle, IRS, Appraisal Review Report and Fair Market Value Conclusion 
(Taxpayer’s Copy) ( June 6, 2011) [hereinafter Appraisal Review Report] (unpublished appraisal) 
(on file with Withers Bergman LLP). 
11 See I.R.C. § 6662(a), (e) (2012) (imposing a percentage penalty for understatements in 
estate valuations); Stephen C. Gara & Craig J. Langstraat, Property Valuation for Transfer Taxes: 
Art, Science, or Arbitrary Decision?, 12 AKRON TAX J. 125, 128 (1996) (providing background on § 6662, 
which generally levies a twenty percent penalty). 
12 See Kinsella, supra note 3 (listing the IRS’s calculations of the estate’s tax liabilities). 
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I. TAX LAW BACKGROUND 
The conundrum encircling Sonnabend’s estate took place against the 
backdrop of the federal transfer tax system.13 Proper administration of the 
Sonnabend estate required the determination of the estate tax payable by 
the executors of the estate, Sonnabend’s children, Antonio Homen and 
Nina Sundell.14 The IRS levies the estate tax based on the value of the 
decedent’s gross estate, which includes the value of property owned at 
death.15 The gross estate includes property items, such as artworks, valued 
at the pieces’ fair market value at the time of death, not at the cost at which 
the decedent acquired the pieces.16 The guiding principle in this area of 
valuation,17 and an essential facet of the Canyon dispute, is the “willing 
buyer, willing seller” principle for fair market value.18 The relevant IRS 
regulations for calculating the fair market value of gross estate items 
provide that one derives the value of a property item from the price at 
which the item hypothetically “would change hands between a willing buyer 
and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell 
 
13 See I.R.C. § 2001(a) (2012) (“A tax is hereby imposed on the transfer of the taxable estate of 
every decedent who is a citizen or resident of the United States.”). 
14 See Patricia Cohen, Art’s Sale Value? Zero. The Tax Bill? $29 Million., N.Y. TIMES ( July 22, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/arts/design/a-catch-22-of-art-and-taxes-starring-a-stuffed-
eagle.html?pagewanted=all, archived at http://perma.cc/3YDR-A9XP (reporting the heirs’ legal 
battles over taxation of the estate); see also Docket, Estate of Sonnabend v. Comm’r, No. 0649-12 
(T.C. 2012) (listing Homen and Sundell as executors). 
15 See I.R.C. § 2031(a) (2012) (“The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined 
by including . . . the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or 
intangible, wherever situated.”); id. § 2033 (2012) (“The value of the gross estate shall include the 
value of all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his 
death.”); see also Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1(a) (as amended in 1963) (“The gross estate of a decedent 
who was a citizen or resident of the United States at the time of his death includes under section 
2033 [of the Internal Revenue Code] the value of all property . . . beneficially owned by the 
decedent at the time of his death.”). 
16 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965) (“The value of every item of property 
includible in a decedent’s gross estate . . . is its fair market value at the time of the decedent’s 
death . . . .”). 
17 The executor of a decedent’s estate may elect an alternate valuation method for calculating 
the estate’s gross value. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1 (as amended in 2005). The permitted alternate 
valuations include postmortem sales and delayed valuations. Id. § 20.2032-1(a)(1), (2). A qualifica-
tion to this rule is that any alternate valuation must decrease both the value of the gross estate and 
the sum of the estate tax. Id. § 20.2032-1(b)(1).  
Other methods also exist for deriving fair market value, such as cost and replacement-value 
valuations. See generally JOHN A. BOGDANSKI, FEDERAL TAX VALUATION ¶ 3.01 (2014), 1998 WL 
1038931 (explaining six different approaches to appraising fair market value). 
18 See generally John G. Steinkamp, Fair Market Value, Blockage, and the Valuation of Art, 71 
DENV. U. L. REV. 335, 345 (1994) (“Fair market value is the price at which both a willing buyer 
and a willing seller would have traded.”). 
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and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.”19 When the item 
is unique, as in the case of an artwork, the “willing buyer, willing seller” 
paradigm becomes more complex.20 
When determining fair market value in disputes, the Tax Court will 
typically consult auction sales data and then appraisal data.21 For valuable 
art and other specific items of personal property, the IRS has established 
specialized groups to aid in valuation matters.22 The IRS’s Art Appraisal 
Services unit and its Art Advisory Panel work to determine the values of 
taxpayers’ art that has been appraised at $50,000 or more;23 experts and 
other experienced figures in the art world serve on the Art Advisory Panel 
and aid in valuation matters.24  The Panel’s determinations, which are 
 
19 Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(b); see also Estate of Jelke v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 1317, 1321 n.11 (11th 
Cir. 2007) (“The buyer and seller are hypothetical, not actual persons, and each is a rational 
economic actor; that is, each seeks to maximize his advantage in the context of the market that 
exists on the valuation date.”); DALE S. ADAMS & ROBERT B. SMITH, FEDERAL ESTATE & 
GIFT TAXATION ¶ 4.02[2][a] (2014), 1999 WL 1031607, at *2 (emphasizing the hypothetical 
nature of the “willing buyer, willing seller” valuation calculation). 
20 See generally Gara & Langstraat, supra note 11, at 144 (“Artwork presents one of the most 
challenging and difficult areas of valuation. Unlike business interests, artwork is inherently 
qualitative and entirely subjective.”); Anne-Marie E. Rhodes, Big Picture, Fine Print: The 
Intersection of Art and Tax, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 179, 196 n.100 (2003) [hereinafter Rhodes 
2003] (affirming the problems inherent in assigning market value to fine art and citing the famous 
example of two Rembrandt impressions, the value of which varied strikingly at auction despite 
being from the same etching); Steinkamp, supra note 18, at 338 (“[V]aluation of art is an inherently 
subjective process and experts’ opinions often vary dramatically.” (footnote omitted)). 
21 See, e.g., Estate of Scull v. Comm’r, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2953 (T.C. 1994), 1994 WL 179764, 
at *15-16 (“We prefer evidence of actual sales of the property to be valued . . . rather than 
estimates or approximations of the price upon which a willing buyer and a willing seller might 
agree.”); Gara & Langstraat, supra note 11, at 146 (discussing Scull and its “emphasis on auction 
sales of the artwork shortly after the valuation date”); see also Anne-Marie Rhodes, Valuing Art in 
an Estate: New Concerns, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 45, 55 (2012) [hereinafter Rhodes 2012] 
(“For original unique works by known established artists, the auction market is commonly used in 
valuation controversies in large measure because of the availability of public sales records.”). 
22  See IRS, Art Appraisal Services, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Art-Appraisal-
Services (last updated Feb. 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/X423-PZS2 (providing an 
overview of the Art Appraisal Services’s activities); IRS, Valuation Assistance for Cases Involving 
Works of Art, IRS.GOV (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-048-002.html 
[hereinafter IRS, Valuation Assistance for Works of Art], archived at http://perma.cc/R9XK-UKD4 
(same); see also ART ADVISORY PANEL OF THE COMM’R OF INTERNAL REVENUE, ANNUAL 
SUMMARY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 2-3 (n.d.) [hereinafter ANNUAL SUMMARY 
REPORT FY 2012], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/annrep2012.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/67MX-UEDD (describing the roles of the Art Appraisal Services unit and the Art 
Advisory Panel of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue). 
23 ANNUAL SUMMARY REPORT FY 2012, supra note 22, at 2. 
24 See id. at 5-6 (listing the Art Advisory Panel’s members for 2012); IRS, Valuation Assistance for 
Works of Art, supra note 22 (“The Commissioner maintains an Art Advisory Panel of nationally 
prominent art museum directors, curators, scholars, art dealers, auction representatives, and 
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structured to prevent the Panel from recognizing the identity of the specific 
owner-taxpayer, are advisory recommendations and are not binding on the 
IRS’s ultimate determinations.25 
II. THE BGEPA AND MBTA 
The federal legislation concerning eagle preservation threw a wrench 
into the administration and taxation of Sonnabend’s estate. Both the Bald 
and Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA) and the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act (MBTA) governed Sonnabend’s use of Canyon by prohibiting a sale of 
the eagle and therefore of the painting.26 Enacted in 1940, the BGEPA 
protects the national symbol and once-endangered species, and its provi-
sions apply retroactively to eagles taken lawfully prior to enactment.27 The 
taxidermy eagle in Canyon is one such specimen. According to Rauschenberg, 
he received the eagle from a colleague named Sari Dienes.28 Dienes found 
the eagle abandoned along with other possessions of Dienes’s deceased 
neighbor, and she gave it to Rauschenberg for inclusion in his artwork.29 
The neighbor was a former member of Theodore Roosevelt’s “Rough 
Riders” during the Spanish-American War; in that capacity, he acquired the 
eagle before the BGEPA’s enactment.30 Rauschenberg then used the eagle 
to create Canyon, later acquired by Sonnabend.31 Canyon first came to the 
Fish and Wildlife Service’s attention in 1981.32 
Had Rauschenberg created Canyon with an eagle taken from the wild 
after 1940, all of the BGEPA’s prohibitions would have applied. In 
Sonnabend’s situation, however, the eagle was taken before 1940, and thus the 
statute did not prohibit possessing or transporting Canyon. Rather, it only 
 
appraisers . . . .”). See generally Rhodes 2003, supra note 20, at 197-98 (describing the Panel’s work 
and comparing statistics from 2000 and 2001 regarding the Panel’s activity). 
25 ANNUAL SUMMARY REPORT FY 2012, supra note 22, at 3. 
26 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 668, 703–712 (2012) (restricting possession of bald and golden eagles and 
other migratory bird species, and prohibiting other enumerated acts). 
27 See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 52-53, 55-58 (extending the BGEPA’s application to 
eagles “lawfully taken before the effective date of federal protection”); see also Roberto Iraola, The 
Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 68 ALB. L. REV. 973, 973-75 (2005) (explaining the statute’s 
conservatory intent and implementation history); Rhodes 2012, supra note 21, at 47-49 (same). 
28 See supra fig.3 (explaining how Dienes obtained the eagle and offered it to Rauschenberg 
for his art). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id.; see also Kinsella, supra note 3 (reporting that Sonnabend acquired Canyon following a 
1959 gallery show). But see Rhodes 2012, supra note 21, at 49 & n.24 (describing the unclear and 
disputed nature of Sonnabend’s acquisition of Canyon). 
32 Rhodes 2012, supra note 21, at 50-51; Silverman & Associates Rebuttal, supra note 9. 
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prohibited taking; selling; purchasing; bartering; offering to sell, purchase, 
or barter; and exporting or importing Canyon.33 Although transportation of a 
lawful pre-1940 eagle is allowed, it requires an official permit from the Fish 
and Wildlife Service, which is only available for limited purposes, such as 
public exhibition.34 The relevant regulations for these permits forbid any 
profit-motivated activity related to the eagle.35 Courts have consistently 
upheld the constitutionality of both the BGEPA and the MBTA.36 
The Ninth Circuit considered the interaction between the BGEPA and 
federal taxation in Sammons v. Commissioner, a case on appeal from the Tax 
Court.37 The Sammons taxpayers had sought a charitable deduction for their 
donation of Native American artifacts—including many pieces that incorpo-
rated feathers and other parts of eagles—to a museum.38 The court considered 
valuation and appraisal disputes regarding the collection as a whole39 before 
applying the BGEPA and MBTA to the “Eagle Artifacts” within the 
collection.40 The IRS argued that the BGEPA rendered the taxpayers’ 
ownership of the Eagle Artifacts—and therefore, the corresponding tax 
deduction—void.41 It also argued that, given the taxpayers’ dubious ownership 
under the BGEPA’s prohibitions, public policy demanded disallowance of 
 
33 See 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2012) (“[N]othing herein shall be construed to prohibit the possession 
or transportation of any bald eagle, alive or dead, . . . lawfully taken prior to June 8, 1940 . . . .”). 
34 See id. § 668a (2012) (noting that the Secretary of the Interior may determine that acts 
normally prohibited are “compatible with the preservation of the bald eagle” and “authorize the 
taking of such eagles pursuant to regulations”); 50 C.F.R. § 22.21 (2013) (“We may . . . issue a 
permit authorizing the taking, possession, transportation within the United States, or transportation 
into or out of the United States of lawfully possessed [eagles] . . . for the scientific or exhibition 
purposes of public museums, public scientific societies, or public zoological parks.”). 
35 See 50 C.F.R. § 22.3 (2013) (defining “[t]ransportation into or out of the United States” to 
require that the eagle “not change ownership at any time [and] . . . not [be] transferred from one 
person to another in the pursuit of gain or profit”). 
36 See generally Iraola, supra note 27, at 977-90 (recounting failed challenges to the BGEPA, 
including challenges asserting religious freedom, abrogation of treaty rights, invalid exercise of 
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, Takings Clause violations, and the right to privacy). The 
BGEPA is often challenged under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act for restricting religious 
expression, due to the significance of eagles and eagle feathers in Native American ceremonial and 
religious practices. See id. at 980-84 (surveying federal case law dealing with permits issued for 
religious purposes); see also 16 U.S.C. § 668a (recognizing the religious significance of eagles to 
Native American tribes and granting the Secretary of the Interior discretion to permit the taking 
of bald and golden eagles “for the religious purposes of Indian tribes”). 
37 See generally Sammons v. Comm’r, 838 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that items obtained 
and possessed in violation of the BGEPA may be donated to a museum for a tax deduction). 
38 Id. at 333. 
39 Id. at 333-34. 
40 Id. at 334-36. 
41 Id. 
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the deduction for the Eagle Artifacts.42 The Sammons court rejected both 
arguments, allowed the charitable deduction, and concluded that such a 
deduction would not impede the conservation purposes of the statute.43 The 
court also affirmed the Tax Court’s use of purchase cost as the valuation 
method for the donated collection—a holding that has particularly interesting 
implications for Sonnabend’s case.44 
III. THE IRS APPRAISAL REVIEW REPORT 
A. Robson v. Commissioner and Related Case Law 
The Sonnabend estate’s legal counsel received an initial unsigned valua-
tion report from the IRS that assigned a $15 million value to Canyon.45 
Following the estate’s rejection of that initial value, the IRS responded with 
a more formal “Appraisal Review Report and Fair Market Value Conclusion” 
that valued the work at $65 million.46 The IRS reached this figure by relying 
on a prior Tax Court decision, Robson v. Commissioner;47 assessing sales 
figures from “comparable” works of art, and highlighting the availability of 
markets outside North America for Canyon.48 
The Tax Court’s analysis in Robson influenced the IRS’s rejection of a 
zero value for Canyon. On its face, the Robson fact pattern mirrors the 
Canyon predicament. 49  But key elements distinguish Robson from the 
Sonnabend dispute. In Robson, the court considered the fair market value of 
animal trophy mounts in the context of disputed income tax deductions for 
 
42 Id. at 336. 
43 See id. (“No evidence was presented tending to prove that allowance of the deduction 
would encourage the killing or acquisition of protected bird species.”). 
44 See id. at 333-34 (noting that “the Sammons offered no proof of sales prices for comparable 
items to establish either fair market value or an existing retail market for these types of Indian 
artifacts” so the court lacked “a definite and firm conviction that the Tax Court made a mistake in 
finding that the Sammons’s cost was the best indicator of the value of the Sammons Collection” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The court affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that 
cost appropriately tracked fair market value, given that the Sammons’s own experts had testified 
that the collection did not increase in value between purchase and donation. Id. at 334. 
45 Interview with Ralph Lerner, supra note 8. 
46 Appraisal Review Report, supra note 10. 
47 Robson v. Comm’r (Robson I), No. 23456-94 (T.C. Apr. 10, 1997), available at https://
www.ustaxcourt.gov/InOpHistoric/ROBSON.TCM.WPD.pdl#xml, archived at http://perma.cc/
25GQ-RME6. 
48 See generally Appraisal Review Report, supra note 10; Interview with Ralph Lerner, supra note 8. 
49 See Robson I, No. 23456-94, slip op. at 3-5 (recounting the tax valuation difficulties 
surrounding the taxpayers’ mounted animal specimens, which California law made illegal to sell). 
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the taxpayers’ charitable donations of the taxidermy game specimens.50 
California, where the donors lived, prohibited the specimens’ sale, but a 
number of neighboring states allowed similar sales.51 The court consulted 
valid sales of comparable items and assigned fair market value to the 
California mounts.52 The court used expert testimony from a taxidermy 
seller and a Fish and Wildlife Service agent to establish “an active market” 
for the mounts.53 The Ninth Circuit upheld the decision on appeal, and its 
opinion emphasized that the “willing buyer, willing seller” paradigm is an 
objective standard and applies without reference to the specific circum-
stances of a particular sale.54 In its words, “there is no requirement that the 
taxpayers themselves actually be able to sell the donated goods.”55 
Robson has instructive value about how legal restrictions affect market 
values. An item’s illegal or contraband status does not and should not 
categorically render an item valueless. Such an immediate assumption 
would be unrealistic and perhaps naïve. California law, functioning like the 
BGEPA and the MBTA, prohibited the sale of the taxpayers’ donations. 
However, the scope of California’s restrictions was limited by other states’ 
different laws controlling game mounts’ sales.56 The Robson taxpayers could 
not sell the mounts in California, but open markets existed elsewhere. As a 
result, the court could find a fair market value with relative ease—in fact, one 
of the expert witnesses ran a company that sold thousands of animal mounts.57 
Robson’s readily available comparables distinguish Robson from the Canyon 
dispute. When identifying the market for the Robson donations, the court 
could look to industry professionals and across state lines. The donated 
mounts had counterparts in available market data about mounts sold in 
 
50 Id. at 2-5. 
51 Id. at 4. 
52 Id. at 8-9 (rejecting the taxpayers’ argument that “there are no comparable sales, because 
residents in California are prohibited from selling game mounts” and citing expert testimony that 
“prices for game mounts in California are equivalent to prices in States that do not place 
restrictions on sales”). 
53 Id. at 6-9. 
54 Robson v. Comm’r (Robson II), 83 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1880, 1881 (9th Cir. 1999); see also 
Rhodes 2012, supra note 21, at 58-59 (explaining the objective Robson test, but distinguishing 
Robson from the Canyon dispute). 
55 Robson II, 83 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA), at 1881. 
56 Robson I, No. 23456-94, slip op. at 4 (“[W]hile California has strict prohibitions on the sale 
of mounted wildlife, many of the Western States located near California, such as New Mexico, Arizona, 
Montana, and Washington, have relatively few restrictions on the sale of mounted game trophies.”). 
57 See id. at 6 (describing the testimony of an expert witness whose company had sold “between 
3,500 and 4,000 game items” since its inception in 1986). 
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other states, and expert testimony confirmed the existence of these compa-
rable items.58 
By contrast, had the dispute between the IRS and the Sonnabend estate 
progressed into litigation, the Tax Court would have lacked information 
from neighboring markets for famous high-end art incorporating bald 
eagles. The BGEPA reaches further than California’s restrictions on 
taxidermy sales: it not only eliminates the market for sales at a national 
level, but also sanctions the mere possession of bald eagles.59 Furthermore, 
regardless of species, the game mounts at issue in Robson were likely more 
fungible. While game mounts are common decorative items, there is no 
equivalent for a globally renowned and one-of-a-kind work of art such as 
Canyon.60 A court attempting to set a price for Canyon would have no 
comparable eagle artwork, or transactions involving such items, to reference. 
Had the taxpayers in Robson rejected the donee organizations and sold the 
trophy mounts, their items would have joined thousands of similar pieces in 
the markets documented by the Robson expert witnesses. But for the interna-
tionally renowned Canyon, no analogous group of comparables would surface. 
Conflict between federal taxation and illegal conduct is not uncharted 
territory for the IRS. In both income and estate taxation, it is relatively 
settled that a conduct’s illegal quality does not shelter its fruits from 
taxation.61 This concept carried the day in a federal estate tax dispute 
regarding the estate of Joseph Meador.62 Meador’s case offers valuable 
 
58 See id. (“[One of the experts] believes that he would be able to assemble a collection comparable 
to petitioners’ by purchasing items on the open market. In fact, [he] currently has in his inventory 
many of the same type of game mounts as those donated by petitioners.”). 
59 See 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2012) (prohibiting both possession and sale of bald eagles). 
60 See Silverman & Associates Rebuttal, supra note 9, at 10-11 (distinguishing Canyon from 
Robson’s trophy mounts by citing the painting’s unique and nonfungible nature as a famous work of art). 
61 For the purposes of income taxation, the Code’s definition of “income” is very broad and 
includes illegal income. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012) (“[G]ross income means all income from 
whatever source derived . . . .”). Courts and academics have consistently supported the taxation of 
gains from illegal conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927) (“We see 
no reason . . . why the fact that a business is unlawful should exempt it from paying the taxes that 
if lawful it would have to pay.”); Boris I. Bittker, Taxing Income from Unlawful Activities, 25 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 130, 137-47 (1974) (arguing for taxation of gains from illegal conduct for policy 
reasons); William J. Turnier, The Pink Panther Meets the Grim Reaper: Estate Taxation of the Fruits of 
Crime, 72 N.C. L. REV. 163, 177-78 (1993) (“[T]he income tax treatment of income derived from 
illegal activities is now quite well established. . . . After struggling with the issue . . . , the 
Supreme Court determined . . . that income derived from an illegal activity . . . was to be included 
in the taxable income of the recipients of such income.”). 
62 See IRS Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-52-005 (Aug. 30, 1991), 1991 WL 779966 [hereinafter Meador 
TAM] (“[F]or federal estate tax purposes, no distinction should be drawn between a decedent’s 
property that has been obtained by theft and decedents’ property that has been lawfully 
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comparisons to the Canyon dispute, given that the property items at issue 
were stolen art pieces placed on the underground market. The IRS produced 
a Technical Advice Memorandum (TAM)63  for the particular facts of 
Meador’s estate, resolving the issue of how to value the stolen items in the 
decedent’s gross estate.64 While serving in Europe during World War II, 
Meador stole several art objects from Quedlinburg, a medieval German town, 
and he returned to his home in Texas with the items.65 After Meador’s 
death, his family members, aware of their relative’s questionable ownership 
of the art objects, attempted to sell some of the medieval manuscripts from 
the stolen collection.66 Given that the objects’ illegality was apparent to 
those who had appraised the items and refused to purchase them, neither 
Meador (while he was alive) nor his surviving family could access the 
legitimate market for sales of the Quedlinburg bounty.67 Nevertheless, after 
obfuscating one manuscript’s chain of title, Meador’s siblings successfully 
sold it to a German rare book dealer for an initial value of $3 million, 
subject to a further bonus if the dealer resold the manuscript for profit.68 
The IRS concluded that Meador’s gross estate should include the stolen 
items, and it then considered case law to determine how to value those 
items.69 Citing cases about the taxation of narcotics enterprises, the IRS 
found that relying on an illicit market to determine fair market value was 
 
obtained.”); see also Turnier, supra note 61, at 164-69 (narrating Meador’s case); William H. 
Honan, A Trove of Medieval Art Turns Up in Texas, N.Y. TIMES ( June 14, 1990), http://www.nytimes.
com/1990/06/14/arts/a-trove-of-medieval-art-turns-up-in-texas.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
T54G-SDD3 (same). 
63 See IRS, Technical Advice Memorandum, IRS.GOV (Oct. 1, 2003), http://www.irs.gov/irm/
part4/irm_04-002-003.html#d0e307, archived at http://perma.cc/2AZC-C7N9 (“A Technical 
Advice Memorandum is intended to establish the proper interpretation and application of the 
Internal Revenue laws to the facts of a specific case.”). As a caveat, TAMs bear limited precedential 
value. See IRS, Examining Process: Examination of Returns: Issue Resolution, IRS.GOV ( Jan. 1, 2006), 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-010-007.html, archived at http://perma.cc/M32G-GY6H (“[A] 
technical advice memorandum . . . should not be applied or relied upon as a precedent in the 
disposition of other cases. However, [it] provide[s] insight with regard to the [IRS]’s position on 
the law and serve[s] as a guide.”). 
64 Meador TAM, supra note 62. 
65 Id.; Honan, supra note 62. 
66 Meador TAM, supra note 62. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 The IRS’s TAM considered the following cases: Publicker v. Commissioner, 206 F. 2d 250 
(3d Cir. 1953) (valuing large diamonds); Browning v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2053 
(T.C. 1991), 1991 WL 25969 (valuing marijuana based on the wholesale street market value); Jones 
v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 1721 (T.C. 1991), 1991 WL 4982 (determining the fair market 
value of cocaine using the “retail street value” of “uncut” cocaine); and Caffery v. Commissioner, 
60 T.C.M. (CCH) 807 (T.C. 1990), 1990 WL 134957 (valuing marijuana using the retail street 
market for low-quality marijuana). 
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routine.70 However, the market paradigm applied to Meador’s stolen items 
considered not only the illicit art market but also the legitimate art market: 
the IRS decided that Meador’s estate should include the stolen property at 
fair market values based on “the discreet retail markets of the international 
network of traffickers in stolen art as well as the legitimate retail art markets 
consisting of international auction firms, advertised displays in antiques 
publications, and legitimate art and antiques dealers.”71 
While the IRS’s inclusion of legitimate art markets appeared to depart 
from the case law’s focus on illicit markets, the approach made sense: 
Narcotics like cocaine and marijuana, addressed in the IRS’s cited precedents, 
could never enter a legitimate market. For Meador, by contrast, his property 
did enter a legitimate market for manuscripts and other art objects.72 The 
Quedlinburg items could appear in auctions and other legitimate sales 
venues, despite their criminal origins. 
Notably, the IRS rejected an argument that the art objects, as items 
without a market, should hold zero value in Meador’s estate.73 Citing case 
law on the valuation of other illicit property, the IRS refused to ignore the 
black market when constructing its “willing buyer, willing seller” paradigm.74 
According to the IRS, “[i]n the case of property that can be sold only in an 
illicit market, the fact that the market is illicit does not obviate the existence 
of that market for estate tax valuation purposes.”75  
Other evidence also bolstered the IRS’s decision. Pointing to secondary 
sources confirming the existence and magnitude of the illicit art market, the 
IRS affirmed that sales of Meador’s stolen property were not impossible.76 
Indeed, an actual transaction had gone forward in the $3 million manuscript 
deal. In addition to this sale after Meador’s death, the IRS inferred that 
 
70 See Meador TAM, supra note 62 (discussing Browning, Jones, and Caffery). 
71 Id. The IRS also distilled the following valuation principle after completing its survey of 
valuation based on illicit markets: 
with respect to property that can only be transferred illegally, 1) the fair market value 
of such property is based on the price that a willing buyer would pay in the relevant 
illicit market, and 2) the relevant illicit market is determined by the particular illicit 
market in which such property is generally sold . . . . 
Id. 
72 See, e.g., Books and Manuscripts, SOTHEBYS, http://www.sothebys.com/en/departments/books-
manuscripts.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/HJ63-WKAM (listing 
upcoming auctions and other information regarding Sotheby’s sales of books and manuscripts). 
73 Meador TAM, supra note 62. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 The IRS cited multiple news articles and the transcript from a news program. See id. 
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multiple other sales had taken place during Meador’s lifetime. 77  After 
considering Meador’s employment, his income, and the fact that the 
decedent had maintained various costly recreational pursuits (such as 
constructing greenhouses to contain an orchid collection), the IRS concluded 
that Meador’s legitimate assets could not have supported his hobbies.78 
As with the Quedlinburg treasures, selling Canyon would have been illegal 
for Sonnabend and her heirs. In both the Meador and Canyon disputes, the 
IRS considered illicit art markets relevant for valuation purposes. However, 
differences between Meador and Sonnabend’s situations grow as one 
scrutinizes the cases more carefully by comparing the two to Robson. Robson 
and Meador’s case support a broad valuation principle that federal taxes do 
not ignore illegal markets and conduct. In Meador’s case, as in Robson, the 
IRS benefited from discrete evidence to help it identify market values to 
attach to estate items. However, the Canyon dispute lacks comparable data.  
Past sales during Meador’s lifetime supported the above-zero valuations 
of his remaining art objects. From both Meador’s lifestyle expenditures and 
his siblings’ attempts to sell the remaining items, the IRS could establish 
that the estate experienced taxable gains.79 The Meador case’s facts showed 
both the existence of a marketplace for his stolen items and the success of 
those items in the marketplace. Similarly, in Robson, like articles moving by 
the thousands through the American market for trophy mounts allowed the 
Tax Court to infer the value of the Robson taxpayers’ donations.80 By 
contrast, Canyon is an item devoid of a black-market paper trail, and no 
evidence exists that Sonnabend attempted to sell Canyon during her lifetime.81  
Nevertheless, arguments regarding the unique status of Canyon as a 
famed artwork do not offer complete rescue from the influence of the 
TAM’s analysis. In the Meador TAM, the IRS acknowledged complications 
regarding unique articles when it cited Publicker, a case in which the Third 
 
77 Id. 
78 See id. (“[I]t does not appear that the Decedent had any job or profession that would enable 
him to acquire a vast orchid collection, travel so extensively, or live so lavishly. It is a compelling 
inference that the Decedent successfully sold a substantial quantity of stolen art objects to finance 
his lifestyle.”). The IRS concluded from this information that Meador had “the unfettered ability” 
to sell the stolen art objects when he so chose. Id. 
79 See Turnier, supra note 61, at 168-69 (discussing the IRS’s position and reasoning). 
80 See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text. 
81 See, e.g., Calvin Tomkins, An Eye for the New, NEW YORKER, Jan. 17, 2000, at 54, 64 (quoting 
Sonnabend’s response to any planned sale of Canyon as “[w]ell . . . , if they build a pyramid for me 
when I die, I would like it in there with me”). 
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Circuit determined the fair market value of massive diamonds.82 In Publicker, 
the taxpayer argued that valuing the diamonds based on retail markets was 
inappropriate because such large luxury items would not enter a retail 
market.83 The court disagreed, reasoning that limited retail interest does not 
imply no interest, and therefore that both the diamonds’ retail and wholesale 
values were appropriate considerations. 84  According to the court, the 
taxpayer’s original purchase of the diamonds plainly demonstrated such 
market interest.85 
Although applying the Meador case’s valuation principles to Canyon 
suffers from Canyon’s lack of relevant comparables, other facets of the 
Meador analysis do provide a framework for understanding how and when 
the IRS decides to include artworks in decedents’ estates. In Meador’s case, 
the IRS considered not only the stolen items’ transaction history, but also 
Meador’s effective ownership over the items, stemming from his length of 
control over them. Meador’s decades of control over the objects, as well as 
his successful sales of the objects, assured the IRS of Meador’s beneficial 
ownership over the pieces.86 Meador’s beneficial ownership further required 
the inclusion of the items in his gross estate.87 Similarly, Sonnabend owned 
Canyon for decades, and during her lifetime she included the painting in 
exhibitions throughout the country and the world.88 Because gross estate 
taxation tracks a decedent’s extent of ownership, tying Canyon to Sonnabend 
is fitting: while she did not obtain economic benefits through a conventional 
sale (as Meador and his relatives did), she did gain intangible benefits, such 
as prestige and renown from her association with a famous work of art. 
Nevertheless, this analysis ignores how the Fish and Wildlife Service’s 
 
82 Publicker v. Comm’r, 206 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1953); see also Meador TAM, supra note 62 
(explaining that, under Publicker, “for nearly every category of property there is at least one 
relevant market for determining fair market value”). 
83 Publicker, 206 F.2d at 253. 
84 See id. at 253-54 (“Large diamonds may not exist to any appreciable extent in the retail 
market, but there remains a market, however limited, for any particular large diamond . . . .”). 
85 Id. at 253. 
86 The IRS also cited Meador’s brother’s ability to leverage some of the items as collateral 
when obtaining a loan. Meador TAM, supra note 62. 
87 See id. at 6-7 (“[Meador] was the substantive owner of the beneficial interest in [the art 
objects] at his death.”). 
88 See, e.g., Silverman & Associates Rebuttal, supra note 9, at 2-5 (listing Canyon’s interna-
tional exhibition history prior to 1998, when the Fish and Wildlife Service stopped granting 
Sonnabend exhibition permits for Canyon). 
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restrictions on Sonnabend’s use of Canyon diluted Sonnabend’s ownership 
of and control over the painting.89 
Threads of the dispute over Canyon thus resemble past conflicts about 
the income and estate taxation of certain controversial items. Robson, the 
Meador case, and the case law examined in the TAM establish contours for 
the analysis of how to tax the Sonnabend estate for Canyon. Although the 
Robson trophy mounts’ fungibility distinguishes them from Canyon, the 
TAM’s consideration of retail markets for rare diamonds in Publicker 
demonstrates the low bar for finding a market. If the Publicker taxpayer’s 
initial purchase of the diamonds served as evidence of a market’s existence,90 
then one could argue that Sonnabend’s longtime interest in Canyon is proof 
that the painting had market value.  
But owning and transporting the diamonds in Publicker did not require 
permits from any federal agency, and the California state law in Robson did 
not impose restrictions comparable to the BGEPA. Nevertheless, while no 
single case provides decisive guidance for Canyon’s valuation, the cases 
collectively provide clear valuation principles that create a framework for 
considering markets relevant to Canyon. 
B. Reaching $65 Million: Comparable Sales 
The IRS’s $65 million valuation of Canyon stands on shaky ground. The 
IRS reached $65 million by consulting the values of various other artworks 
that its Appraisal Report named as items comparable to Canyon.91 Even if 
Canyon boasts a sufficiently high fair market value on which to hang an 
estate tax, the $65 million conclusion remains problematically oversimpli-
fied. According to the Appraisal Report, the IRS derived the $65 million 
figure by examining various sales databases, such as auction histories and 
online auction sites like Artnet.com.92  The IRS’s comparative analysis 
largely focused on sales of other Rauschenberg works and works by Andy 
Warhol and Jasper Johns.93 
To evaluate the value of Rauschenberg’s pieces on the retail market, the 
Appraisal Report highlighted two of his pieces, Overdrive and The Tower, 
 
89 See Rhodes 2012, supra note 21, at 51-54, for further analysis of the BGEPA’s implications 
on Sonnabend’s ownership interests in Canyon. Rhodes analyzes Sonnabend’s diluted ownership as 
a means of criticizing the $65 million valuation and questioning the substantiality of Sonnabend’s 
ownership of the painting. 
90 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. 
91 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
92 Appraisal Review Report, supra note 10, at 1-8; see also ARTNET, http://www.artnet.com 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/QB2H-KT45. 
93 Appraisal Review Report, supra note 10, at 5-7. 
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each of which had recently entered the auction marketplace.94 Overdrive sold 
at Sotheby’s in 2008 for $14,601,000, and The Tower was valued between $12 
million and $18 million before its withdrawal from auction.95 The Report 
used the Overdrive and The Tower prices to set a valuation floor for Canyon. 
The Appraisal Report argued that the value of Canyon exceeded the values 
of Overdrive and The Tower based on to the piece’s greater novelty and 
artistic quality.96 
 




94 See infra figs.4-5 for images of these two pieces. 
95 Appraisal Review Report, supra note 10, at 5-7; see also Art Market Watch: Sotheby’s Contemporary 
Does $362 Million, ARTNET (May 15, 2008), http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/news/artmarketwatch/
artmarketwatch5-15-08.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/R8DF-JJ6N (“A new auction record was 
set for Robert Rauschenberg, the much-loved Pop pioneer who died on Monday at age 82, when 
his high-Pop 1963 Overdrive . . . sold for $14,601,000 . . . to a phone bidder.”). 
96 Appraisal Review Report, supra note 10, at 7. 
97 Kelly Crow, Rauschenberg’s Death Could Affect Auction of Works by Sotheby’s, WALL ST. J. 
(May 13, 2008, 4:01 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ontheblock/2008/05/13/rauschenbergs-death-could-
affect-auction-of-works-by-sothebys, archived at http://perma.cc/LJK9-MKMA. 
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Figure 5: The Tower, Robert Rauschenberg (1957)98 
 
The Appraisal Report grouped Rauschenberg’s works with those by 
Warhol and Johns, but provided minimal reasoning for the grouping.99 
Naming a work by each of the other artists, the Appraisal Report noted the 
$71,720,000 sale at auction of Warhol’s Green Car Crash and the estimated 
 
98 Sara Krulwich, “The Tower” from “Robert Rauschenberg: Combines” at the Metropolitan Museum, 
N.Y. TIMES (2005), http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2005/12/22/arts/20051223_RAUS_SLIDE
SHOW_5.html, archived at http://perma.cc/US6F-BGBM. 
99 The three artists’ works could collectively be characterized as “Pop Art” and “postwar 
contemporary art.” Exhibitions have featured Rauschenberg and Johns’s art together, and the 
Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) currently displays Canyon in the same gallery room as works by 
Johns. See generally Press Release, Christie’s, Christie’s Establishes Highest Post-War and 
Contemporary Art Sale Total in History at $384,654,400 and Continues to Dominate the High 
End of the Market (May 16, 2007), available at http://www.christies.com/presscenter/pdf/
05172007/101952.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E29V-5G9H (highlighting Johns and Warhol’s 
works in a press release about a “Post-War and Contemporary Art” auction); Art Market Watch: 
Sotheby’s Contemporary Does $362 Million, supra note 95 (describing Rauschenberg as a “Pop 
pioneer” and discussing Overdrive’s sale alongside sales of Andy Warhol’s works); Dancing around 
the Bride: Cage, Cunningham, Johns, Rauschenberg, and Duchamp, PHILA. MUSEUM ART, 
http://www.philamuseum.org/exhibitions/765.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5TXT-7N69 
(describing an exhibition featuring “postwar avant-garde art” by both Johns and Rauschenberg); 
Hide/Seek, NAT’L PORTRAIT GALLERY, http://npg.si.edu/exhibit/hideseek (follow “Enter site” 
hyperlink; then follow “Consensus and Conflict” hyperlink; then follow “Enter gallery” hyperlink 
to view artworks included in the exhibit) (last visited Mar. 13, 2015), archived at http://
perma.cc/GY89-RSEC (exhibiting Johns and Rauschenberg’s works in the “Consensus and 
Conflict” gallery and explaining how, in the 1950s, “artists like Robert Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns 
coded their opposition to the prevailing political and cultural winds in their artworks”). 
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auction value range for Johns’s Flag of $10–15 million.100 The Report cited 
Canyon’s larger physical size compared to Green Car Crash and Flag as 
reason to increase Canyon’s value, resulting in a valuation range of $30–70 
million.101 The $65 million conclusion, at the upper end of this range, derived 
from conditions in the art market in 2007, the year of Sonnabend’s death.102 
The IRS’s survey of market comparables for Canyon is flawed for several 
reasons. Although Canyon is among Rauschenberg’s better-known works103 
and it is common to group Rauschenberg, Johns, and Warhol together as 
artists within a similar stylistic movement,104 the IRS’s analysis relies on 
outlier market behaviors, particularly in Green Car Crash’s case. The Christie’s 
auction that included Green Car Crash was record-breaking overall, and the 
$71.7 million sale was a personal record for Warhol.105 To value another 
artist’s work on the then-highest sale of a Warhol piece is imprudent.106 
Given the preferred “willing buyer, willing seller” valuation framework,107 
relying on sales histories of “comparable” works to establish fair market 
value is overbroad and inexact. Consider, for example, the valuation 
analyses in the illegal income cases, such as those involving marijuana and 
cocaine trafficking.108 There, the courts valued the drugs based on their 
specific characteristics, such as the geographic location where the drugs were 
sold, or the wholesale value of marijuana of a certain quality.109  
Compare that level of specificity to the level in the IRS’s comparables 
analysis. The IRS set a value range of $30–70 million for Canyon after listing 
 
100 Appraisal Review Report, supra note 10, at 5-7. 
101 Id. at 6-7. 
102 Id. at 7. 
103 See Robert Rauschenberg (1925), ARTPRICE (Mar. 30, 2009) http://artprice.com/artmarket
insight/96/Robert+Rauschenberg+%281925%29, archived at http://perma.cc/D7AE-ERHB (“[Rausch-
enberg’s] most sought-after works are the Combine paintings of the 1950s, but they are also the 
hardest to find.”); Carol Vogel, Wall Power at the Spring Auctions, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/01/arts/design/20110501-auction.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/Q23H-W4WE (noting how Rauschenberg’s combines are “among his best-loved work”). 
104 See sources cited supra note 99 for discussion of Rauschenberg’s role as a Pop artist. 
105 See Press Release, supra note 99 (“The epicenter of the sale was [Warhol’s] Green Car 
Crash . . . which achieved $71.7 million and set a new record for the artist at auction.”). 
106 The appraisal and rebuttal materials provided by BSJ Fine Art and Jacqueline Silverman 
& Associates echo these concerns. See BSJ Fine Art, supra note 9, at 42; Silverman & Associates 
Rebuttal, supra note 9, at 8; see also Rhodes 2012, supra note 21, at 70 (“The choice of Warhol, 
clearly and unquestionably one of the top twentieth century artists selling at auction, as a 
comparable for Robert Rauschenberg . . . is inappropriate and not defensible. Warhol is truly in a 
class by himself for auction sales.”). 
107 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
108 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 69. 
109 See supra note 69 (discussing the cases’ valuation analyses). 
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sales values of four pieces from the New York auction market.110 But these 
markets were not open to Canyon.111  
Furthermore, the Department of Treasury’s regulation specifies that the 
hypothetical willing buyer and willing seller should act without “any 
compulsion to buy or to sell” and that “both [should] hav[e] reasonable 
knowledge of relevant facts.” 112  But one account of the IRS’s Canyon 
valuation suggests that the IRS failed to follow the regulation’s analytical 
presumption. According to a New York Times interview with a member of 
the IRS Art Advisory Panel (the body tasked with determining Canyon’s 
fair market value), the Panel ignored relevant facts that would unquestionably 
affect hypothetical market transactions for Canyon.113 As reported in the 
interview, “the group evaluated ‘Canyon’ solely on its artistic value, without 
reference to any accompanying restrictions or laws.”114 For Canyon, however, 
market value and artistic value are not identical. The legal restrictions that 
the Fish and Wildlife Service imposed on Sonnabend affect Canyon’s 
market value but arguably not its artistic value. Valuing the painting at $65 
million solely with respect to the piece’s artistic significance inappropriately 
disregards the how legal regulation affects its market value. Furthermore, by 
law, regulatory restrictions on property (including the BGEPA in this case) 
may affect federal tax appraisals of fair market value.115 These weaknesses in 
the IRS’s comparables analysis cast significant doubt on the Appraisal 
Report’s $65 million valuation. 
C. Canyon in a Hypothetical International Market 
One of the more notorious aspects of the dispute between the IRS and 
Sonnabend’s estate centered on whether markets for Canyon actually exist. 
As discussed above, the BGEPA prohibits Canyon’s sale in the United 
States.116 Yet Ralph Lerner, counsel for the estate, asserts that the existence 
 
110 See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text. 
111 See Silverman & Associates Rebuttal, supra note 9, at 8 (noting how the IRS used market 
data inapplicable to Canyon). 
112 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965). 
113 See Cohen, supra note 14 (“‘The ruling about the eagle is not something the Art Advisory 
Panel considered,’ [the Panel member] said, adding that the work’s value is defined by its artistic 
worth.”); see also RICHARD L. FOX, CHARITABLE GIVING ¶ B4.03 (2012), 2013 WL 4104656 
(reporting the same quote about the Panel’s analysis); Rhodes 2012, supra note 21, at 67-68 
(describing the Art Advisory Panel’s members and procedures, and highlighting the Panel’s 
possible lack of objectivity when appraising Canyon). 
114 Cohen, supra note 14. 
115 See BOGDANSKI, supra note 17, ¶ 6.02 (explaining how appraisers may and should take 
legal restrictions, such as wartime government restrictions, into account in fair market valuations). 
116 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
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of markets outside the United States partly motivated the IRS’s valuation 
decision.117 In a telephone call, Joseph Bothwell, then-head of the IRS’s Art 
Advisory Panel, offered the example of a “secret Chinese billionaire” as a 
potential willing buyer for Canyon, despite the BGEPA restrictions.118 
Imagining this international sale requires a return to the analysis of illicit 
markets introduced in the Robson case about trophy mounts and Joseph 
Meador’s case about stolen Quedlinburg property.119 Analyzing the black 
market for art lessens the initial incredulity one might experience when 
thinking about this facet of the IRS’s determination.120 
Selling Canyon to any international buyer—secret Chinese billionaire or 
otherwise—would first require transporting the work out of the country, 
which would itself render the transaction illicit.121 Prior to 1998, Sonnabend 
had successfully brought Canyon overseas for multiple exhibitions, with the 
express permission of the Fish and Wildlife Service.122 However, in 1998, 
Sonnabend received word from the Fish and Wildlife Service that they 
would no longer grant transportation permits.123 Sonnabend managed to retain 
possession of Canyon only after providing a notarized statement from 
Rauschenberg confirming that the eagle died prior to the BGEPA’s enactment.124 
Without permits allowing Sonnabend to bring Canyon abroad, the only 
activities allowed under the BGEPA were Sonnabend’s possession and 
domestic transportation of Canyon.125 
 
117 Interview with Ralph Lerner, supra note 8. 
118 Id.; see also Janet Novack, Even Rich Heirs Deserve A Fair Shake From The IRS, FORBES 
(Feb. 23, 2012, 6:30 PM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2012/02/23/even-rich-heirs-
deserve-a-fair-shake-from-the-irs, archived at http://perma.cc/85FX-CA2V (quoting Lerner as 
saying that “[Bothwell] told me there could be a market for the work, for example, a recluse 
billionaire in China might want to buy it and hide it”). 
119 See supra Section III.A. 
120 Anne-Marie Rhodes argues in her recent article discussing the Canyon controversy that 
policy considerations recommend against relying on illicit markets when calculating fair market 
value. See Rhodes 2012, supra note 21, at 55-60. 
121 See 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2012) (penalizing actual or attempted exportation when the actor 
knows that it is “contrary to any law or regulation of the United States”). Exporting Canyon would 
violate the BGEPA and therefore violate 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) as well. 
122 See Silverman & Associates Rebuttal, supra note 9 (detailing Sonnabend’s ownership history 
and her relationship with the Fish and Wildlife Service after 1981, when it became aware of the 
painting’s unique circumstances); see also Rhodes 2012, supra note 21, at 50-51 (same). 
123 See Silverman & Associates Rebuttal, supra note 9 (including a letter from Diane Pence of 
the Department of the Interior, notifying Sonnabend of the change). 
124 See id. (reporting the events); supra fig.3 (describing how Rauschenberg obtained the eagle 
from a colleague’s deceased neighbor, who had obtained the eagle prior to 1940). 
125 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
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But assessing a potential international market to which Sonnabend’s 
estate126 may have been able to smuggle Canyon requires reliance on sparse 
data about the illicit art market. Nearly all of the data and scholarship on 
this subject deal with stolen art and looted objects of cultural heritage. 
Although Canyon would not be stolen art in the same sense, transporting 
the piece out of the United States in contravention of the Fish and Wildlife 
Service’s restrictions would give Canyon a compromised status and affect its 
access to legitimate markets. For tax valuation purposes, its compromised 
market value should be the one considered in a hypothetical international 
sale. To do so requires studying the illicit art market. 
Limited information about the illicit art market exists. An initial review 
of the black market for art reveals the staggering magnitude of the industry, 
which by multiple accounts is a multibillion dollar enterprise.127 Although 
illicit artworks do move through the black market for purchase, their trades 
take place perhaps more often as leverage for other illegal dealings.128 One 
cannot deny the illicit market’s existence, and so a work’s value does not 
become zero solely because its sale would have questionable legality. 
Various law enforcement bodies target the illicit art market and strive to 
curb illegal trade, and they provide valuable insight about how the illicit art 
market operates. Since 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has 
maintained an Art Crime Team dedicated to the recovery of stolen art 
objects.129 The Italian Carabinieri operate an art theft group within their 
 
126 For simplicity’s sake, this Note will not consider details regarding the actors in such a 
hypothetical situation. 
127 See Noah Charney, Four Art Crimes and Their Effect on the Art Trade (“[A]rt crime has 
evolved into the third highest-grossing annual criminal trade worldwide, behind only the drug and 
arms trades.”), in ART AND CRIME: EXPLORING THE DARK SIDE OF THE ART WORLD 107, 
107 (Noah Charney ed., 2009); Rhodes 2003, supra note 20, at 183 n.19 (estimating the worldwide 
stolen art trade to be worth between $6–7 billion annually); Ed Caesar, What is the Value of Stolen 
Art?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/17/magazine/what-is-the-
value-of-stolen-art.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5FHN-BVM3 (“Billions of dollars’ worth of 
art goes missing every year, according to the F.B.I. . . . .”). 
128 Charney, supra note 127, at 109 (“[C]riminals profit from art theft in a variety of ways that 
tend not to involve resale . . . .”); Amber J. Slattery, Comment, To Catch an Art Thief: Using 
International and Domestic Laws to Paint Fraudulent Art Dealers into a Corner, 19 VILL. SPORTS & 
ENT. L.J. 827, 834 (2012) (“Stolen art also becomes profitable when it is exchanged for ransom, 
rather than fair market value.”). 
129 See Art Crime Team, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/vc_majorthefts/arttheft/
art-crime-team (last visited Mar. 13, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/QK99-S28A (describing the 
Art Crime Team’s inception in 2004, as well as its members, training, responsibilities, and 
successes); Caesar, supra note 127 (reporting how the FBI’s Art Crime Team estimates that sale 
prices for artworks on the illegal art market are “a small fraction of the works’ legitimate value”). 
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police force, and Interpol also devotes time to policing illicit artwork.130 
Several online databases also catalogue and publicize stolen artworks.131 
These groups’ efforts have helped to shed light on the criminal world’s 
interactions with art and hinder the activities of those in the black mar-
ket.132 
To evaluate the hypothetical arrival of Canyon in the illicit art market, 
Robert Wittman, a founding member of the FBI Art Crime Team, provided 
critical assistance.133 For the Canyon dispute, the IRS retained Wittman as 
an art theft expert and as a potential expert witness if the Sonnabend case 
continued into court.134 An international sale of Canyon would inherently 
create an underlying United States Customs violation for transporting the 
painting outside of the United States without a permit.135 A violator could 
 
130 Caesar, supra note 127 (explaining how the Carbinieri and Interpol managed computerized 
databases of stolen art); Comando Carabinieri per la Tutela del Patrimonio Culturale, ARMA DEI 
CARABINIERI, http://www.carabinieri.it/internet/cittadino/informazioni/Tutela/Patrimonio+Culturale 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3W2Y-A37P (explaining the origins and 
history of the Carabinieri for the Protection of Cultural Heritage); Works of Art, INTERPOL, 
http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Works-of-art/Works-of-art (last visited Mar. 13, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/H9B6-LBF5 (explaining how Interpol combats thefts of art pieces). 
131 Interpol and the FBI publish such lists, as does the private-sector Art Loss Register. See 
National Stolen Art File (NSAF), FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/vc_majorthefts/
arttheft/national-stolen-art-file (last visited Mar. 13, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/T4ME-
XZZ2 (“The NSAF is a computerized index of stolen art and cultural property as reported to the 
FBI by law enforcement agencies throughout the United States and the world.”); Our Company, 
ART LOSS REG., http://www.artloss.com/about-us/our-company (last visited Mar. 13, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/NNU2-2Y7X (“The [Art Loss Register] is the world’s largest private 
database of lost and stolen art, antiquities and collectables.”); Works of Art, supra note 130 
(explaining how Interpol serves as a central repository on stolen artwork data). 
132 See, e.g., Caesar, supra note 127 (interviewing a former art thief who noted the complicating 
effects of the art theft databases on what used to be simple illegal art transactions). According to 
the FBI, its Art Crime Team alone is responsible for recovering thousands of pieces. See Art Crime 
Team, supra note 129 (“Since its inception, the Art Crime Team has recovered more than 2,650 
items . . . .”). 
133 Wittman served as Senior Investigator on the Art Crime Team for many years, and he 
currently operates a private service for art recovery. See About Robert K. Wittman, ROBERT 
WITTMAN INC., http://www.robertwittmaninc.com/about.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/P98Y-AGC6 (recounting Wittman’s professional history); Randy 
Kennedy, His Heart is in the Art of Sleuthing, N.Y. TIMES ( June 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/06/07/arts/design/07wittman.html, archived at http://perma.cc/J86R-HWCL (detailing Wittman’s 
career with the Art Crime Team). See generally ROBERT WITTMAN & JOHN SHIFFMAN, 
PRICELESS: HOW I WENT UNDERCOVER TO RESCUE THE WORLD’S STOLEN TREASURES 
(2010) (same). 
134 Telephone Interview with Robert Wittman, former Senior Investigator and Founder of 
the Art Crime Team, FBI (Nov. 4, 2013). 
135 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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be punished with up to ten years in prison or a fine.136 But according to 
Wittman, federal law and customs regulations do not result in complete 
deterrence. Emphasizing the magnitude of national customs activity that 
occurs in just one day, Wittman opined that taking Canyon out of the United 
States would not be terribly difficult.137 Given the number of exit points out 
of the country and the volume of shipments moving through those points 
on any given day, Canyon could slip past notice with relative ease.138 
For a hypothetical artwork smuggled out of the United States, experts 
agree that the work would not have traction in illicit markets without a 
heavy price reduction.139 Based on his experience as an undercover FBI 
agent structuring deals for stolen art, Wittman estimated that the value of 
artwork on the black market typically began at the floor price of ten percent 
of the item’s legitimate value.140 Wittman himself set similar floors while 
undercover.141 Therefore, Wittman’s best estimate of Canyon’s black-market 
value was ten percent of the painting’s legitimate value.142  
Thus even a hypothetical illicit international sale would rely on the 
existence of a legitimate market value, and so a fair market valuation of 
Canyon remains problematic. The BGEPA restrictions close off a legitimate 
sale, the price of which would inform the calculation of Canyon’s value on 
the black market.  
The IRS’s Appraisal Report reasoned that Sonnabend could have made 
a charitable gift of Canyon to a nonprofit organization.143 But if Sonnabend 
had made such a gift, she would not have relieved the IRS of the valuation 
dilemma. As with estate tax valuation rules, the IRS derives the amount of a 
charitable donation—and, by extension, the amount of the donor’s tax 
deduction—partly from the donated property’s fair market value.144 
 
136 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2012). 
137 Telephone Interview with Robert Wittman, supra note 134. 
138 Id. 
139 Id.; see also Charney, supra note 127, at 109 (“[An artwork’s] value is marked at 7–10% of its 
legitimate auction value—the amount that criminals could sell it for, were they willing to run the 
risk of seeking a buyer.”); Caesar, supra note 127 (“Some estimates put the average [price for a 
stolen item] at 7 to 10 percent of perceived open-market value.”). 
140 Telephone Interview with Robert Wittman, supra note 134. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Appraisal Review Report, supra note 10. 
144 See I.R.C. § 170(a), (e) (2012) (allowing tax deductions for certain donations of tangible 
personal property and calculating the deductions with reference to “long-term capital gain if the 
property contributed had been sold by the taxpayer at its fair market value”); see also Rhodes 2003, 
supra note 20, at 18-90 (“For a work of art that is capital gain property, satisfies the related use 
rule, and is donated to a public charity, the deduction is the full fair market value of the work of art.”). 
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Canyon’s public visibility adds a further wrinkle to imagining its illicit 
disposition. Commentators on the illicit market in general and on the 
Canyon dispute in particular suggest that, once an artwork reaches a certain 
level of fame, it will not sell on the black market.145 Wittman agreed that pieces 
with significant renown draw no illicit buyers willing to risk buying a work 
sure to garner attention.146 It is unclear whether this would require adjusting 
the “willing buyer, willing seller” paradigm for Canyon’s valuation purposes. 
A question that runs throughout the dispute is the level of generality at 
which one should judge Canyon’s valuation. The apparent impossibility of 
selling famous artwork illegally may create too narrow a focus. However, 
the errors of ignoring legal restrictions and considering inaccessible U.S. 
auction markets are more glaring. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the IRS settled its dispute with the estate in 2013 and required 
no penalty for Canyon.147 The estate paid no estate tax and donated Canyon 
in November 2012 to the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in New York.148 
Consistent with its initial statement of intent and zero-value position, the 
estate claimed no charitable deduction for the painting. 
Reflecting on the Sonnabend case, the relevant precedents supported 
casting a wide net in the taxation of property, including illegal property and 
fine art. This conclusion received support from the “willing buyer, willing 
seller” paradigm, from the TAM about Joseph Meador’s estate, and from 
the Ninth Circuit’s Robson opinion, which had emphasized the objective 
nature of the “willing buyer, willing seller” test. Despite legal restrictions, 
the Robson taxpayers and Meador’s heirs managed to donate or sell illegally 
 
145 See Charney, supra note 127, at 109 (“For famous works [that have been stolen], there is 
basically no market, black or otherwise.”); FOX, supra note 113 (“[T]here is apparently no black 
market for an iconic piece in any event.”); Silverman & Associates Rebuttal, supra note 9, at 11 (noting 
that in the field of art theft, it is generally accepted that one cannot sell significantly recognizable 
pieces on the black market); Telephone Interview with Robert Wittman, supra note 134 (same). 
146 Telephone Interview with Robert Wittman, supra note 134. 
147 See Interview with Ralph Lerner, supra note 8 (recounting the case’s formal settlement on 
May 7, 2013); see also IRS Appeals Office, Closing Agreement on Final Determination Covering 
Specific Matters (May 7, 2013) [hereinafter Closing Agreement] (unpublished settlement 
agreement) (on file with Withers Bergman LLP). 
148 Closing Agreement, supra note 147; see also Patricia Cohen, MoMA Gains Treasure that Met 
Also Coveted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/28/arts/design/moma-
gains-treasure-that-metropolitan-museum-of-art-also-coveted.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
4HVH-2R4M (reporting Canyon’s move to a permanent display at MoMA). 
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obtained property, and the IRS likewise managed to obtain dispositive 
evidence for valuation purposes. 
The cases suggest that a fair market value for Canyon exists, a conclusion 
supported by the presence of illicit art markets and the alleged ease of 
smuggling artwork. The Fish and Wildlife Service forbade Sonnabend from 
selling or transporting Canyon internationally, but sales of art still happen 
despite such restrictions.  
But relying on illegal conduct to find a price makes more sense when 
there is evidence of such conduct; here, there was no such evidence for 
Sonnabend. The difficulties of taxing Canyon arise from differences between 
the work’s qualitative and quantitative value149 and from the aversion to 
describing such a prominent work as worthless and therefore not taxable.150 
Indeed, Canyon’s qualitative height may preclude even its illicit sale. If so, 
the IRS could not even consider the illicit market from the “willing buyer, 
willing seller” perspective, despite the emphasis on objectivity in Robson’s 
appellate decision. 
Had the case moved forward with litigation, perhaps the IRS would 
have pivoted its position, but as the situation stands now, the Sonnabend 
estate considers the settlement a victory. 151  MoMA also considers the 
settlement a success: in December 2013, it opened a special exhibition 
dedicated to Sonnabend and titled “Ileana Sonnabend: Ambassador for the 
New.”152 Canyon’s prominent place in the exhibition was an alleged condition 
of MoMa acquiring the piece.153 
  
 
149 See Silverman & Associates Rebuttal, supra note 9, at 11 (asserting no quantifiable value 
for Canyon). 
150 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 14 (quoting a member of the IRS Art Advisory Panel evaluat-
ing Canyon, who said that the Panel members “all just cringed at the idea of saying that [Canyon] 
had zero value”). 
151 Interview with Ralph Lerner, supra note 8. 
152  See Ileana Sonnabend: Ambassador for the New, MOMA EXHIBITIONS, http://www.
moma.org/visit/calendar/exhibitions/1440 (last visited Mar. 13, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/
A54L-SHPU (describing the exhibition and honoring Sonnabend’s legacy). The exhibition 
prominently features Canyon. See Holland Cotter, A Legendary Dealer’s Eagle Eye: ‘Ileana Sonnabend: 
Ambassador for the New’ at MoMA, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/
20/arts/design/ileana-sonnabend-ambassador-for-the-new-at-moma.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
G583-4YEQ (“Rauschenberg’s monumental 1959 assemblage or ‘combine’ titled ‘Canyon’ has pride 
of place just inside the gallery entrance, and for good reason. It was Sonnabend’s favorite among 
the thousands of objects she acquired.”). 
153 See Cohen, supra note 148 (reporting that the Sonnabend heirs wanted the “higher profile 
and greater context” that Canyon would receive at MoMA). 
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